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OPINION OF THE COURT
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
In this federal follow-up to a foreclosure case, Michael
Earl Davis is pursuing a variety of claims against an entity
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that he calls “Wells Fargo U.S. Bank National Association as
Trustee for the Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust,
2005-11.” It is the purported holder of Davis’s mortgage, and
we will refer to it as “Wells Fargo” or “the bank.”1 Davis has
also sued Assurant, Inc., believing it to be the provider of
insurance on his home. His claims against both Wells Fargo
and Assurant arise from damage that occurred to his house
after Wells Fargo had locked him out of it, damage that went
unrepaired and worsened into severe structural problems.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania dismissed Davis’s claims against Wells Fargo,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on the
grounds that claim preclusion and a statute of limitations
barred recovery. We will affirm that portion of the District
Court’s order.
The District Court also dismissed all of Davis’s claims
against Assurant, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court
reasoned that Davis lacked standing to bring those claims
because he sued the wrong corporate entity, namely Assurant,
when he should have sued Assurant’s wholly-owned
1

In its brief, Wells Fargo contends that Davis has
actually treated two distinct entities as one. It says that,
“Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., is the servicer for U.S. Bank with
respect to [Davis]’s mortgage loan.” (Answering Br. at 2
n.2.) Davis’s ability, or lack thereof, to distinguish between
different corporate entities animates much of this appeal and
has had important consequences. Any distinction between
Wells Fargo and U.S. Bank is, however, irrelevant for our
current purposes, as we will affirm the dismissal of all claims
against the bank Davis is trying to sue, whatever its name.
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subsidiary, American Security Insurance Company (“ASIC”).
That conclusion about standing was in error. Standing is
indeed a jurisdictional predicate, but, rightly understood, this
case is not about standing at all. An analysis of standing
generally focuses on whether the plaintiff is the right party to
bring particular claims, not on whether the plaintiff has sued
the right party. The latter question goes not to standing and
jurisdiction but to the merits of the claims themselves.
Therefore, the District Court erred in considering the claims
against Assurant under Rule 12(b)(1) rather than Rule
12(b)(6). That difference has important consequences here.
In the end, the difference between those rules of procedure
dictates that we vacate that portion of the District Court’s
order dismissing Davis’s breach of contract claim against
Assurant and remand for further proceedings.
I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background2

Davis is a resident of Philadelphia. On July 29, 2005,
he executed a mortgage on a house there (“the Property”),
with BNC Mortgage, Inc. (“BNC”) as the mortgagee. Twoand-a-half years later, on January 5, 2008, it was Wells Fargo
that – claiming to be an assignee of the mortgage – locked
Davis out of the Property. The amended complaint alleges
that Wells Fargo did so “on the pretense that it held a valid
mortgage contract” (S28), but that it, in fact, acted without
2

For purposes of the motions to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), we recount the facts as alleged by the non-movant,
Davis, accepting them as true. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).
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holding the note, a mortgage assignment, or any other legal
interest in the Property. Three weeks later, on January 24,
2008, Wells Fargo commenced a foreclosure action against
Davis in state court, in which it obtained a default judgment.
The details of how and when Davis’s mortgage was assigned
to Wells Fargo are not clear from the record before us, but we
do know that on February 8, 2008, Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), as nominee for BNC,
purported to assign the mortgage to Wells Fargo. Davis
alleges that BNC had not authorized MERS to assign the
mortgage or note to Wells Fargo, rendering the assignment
“fraudulent.” (S4, ¶11.) Regardless, the assignment was
recorded in Philadelphia County on February 20, 2008. As
the foregoing dates show, this assignment was made after
Davis had already been locked out of the Property and after
foreclosure proceedings had already begun.
Davis is also a Lieutenant Colonel in the United States
Army Reserve, and, on September 15, 2008, the Army placed
him on active duty. He promptly provided a copy of his
military orders to Wells Fargo, because of the foreclosure
action that it had brought against him. Upon receiving the
copy of those orders, Wells Fargo filed a motion to vacate the
default judgment it had obtained. The judgment was vacated
shortly thereafter.
Davis remained on active duty from October 1, 2008,
through October 1, 2011. While he was away, in April 2009,
Wells Fargo obtained “force-placed” insurance on the
Property, i.e., insurance placed by a mortgagee rather than the
property owner. The identity of the carrier is in dispute.
According to Assurant, the carrier is ASIC, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Assurant. Davis has alleged that Assurant is the
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entity actually responsible for the insurance coverage.
Davis’s amended complaint also alleges that Wells Fargo and
Assurant conspired to extract excessive premiums from him
through the force-placed insurance, in a scheme that paid
Wells Fargo kickbacks in exchange for the bank making
Assurant the exclusive provider of force-placed insurance for
bank-related properties.
Less than two weeks after Davis returned from active
duty, on October 12, 2011, MERS, as nominee for BNC,
again purported to assign Davis’s mortgage on the Property to
Wells Fargo. Soon thereafter, Wells Fargo inspected the
Property and “discovered a roof leak in the master bedroom
that was also damaging the ceiling, wall and flooring” (S5
¶19), and the following day filed an insurance claim. An
adjuster examined the property and filed a report estimating
that repairs would cost $817. The amended complaint alleges
that, in late November, 2011, “Wells Fargo and Assurant
Insurance Company fraudulently negotiated a $317 settlement
of the roof leak damage claim that did not address the roof.”
(S5 ¶22.) Exhibits to the amended complaint indicate that the
$317 payment is the amount of the adjuster’s damage
assessment, after a $500 deductible. Wells Fargo kept the
money. Despite the insurance claim it made, the bank did not
fix the leak, and the Property continued to deteriorate. All of
this occurred without Davis’s knowledge.
Nearly a year later, Davis received a notice from the
City of Philadelphia, saying that the Property had been
designated unsafe due to a partially collapsed wall. The
notice directed Davis to make all necessary repairs or take
down the wall within 30 days. Still locked out, Davis told
Wells Fargo of the problem and obtained access to the
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Property. He filed a claim with Assurant the next day for the
property damage, being unaware that Wells Fargo had already
settled a claim for the roof leak. Assurant denied his claim on
October 28, 2012.
B.

Procedural Background

Earlier that same month, on October 18, 2012, Davis
brought his first lawsuit against Wells Fargo in the District
Court. Davis v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 2:12-cv-05943TJS (the “2012 action”). He filed an amended, two-count
complaint on December 7, 2012, asserting claims against
Wells Fargo for trespass and violation of the Servicemembers
Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 3901, et seq. (“SCRA”).3 The
District Court dismissed the SCRA claim and declined to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law trespass
claim. The Court went on to explain that Davis would not be
barred by the statute of limitations from reasserting his
trespass claim if he “promptly file[d] a certified transcript of
the judgment and pleadings” from the District Court in a
court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (S279 n.1; see
also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5103(b).) Unfortunately for Davis,
he did not do so.
Instead, he waited nearly two years and then
commenced this second action in the District Court on
December 11, 2014. In his amended complaint in the present
case, he makes claims against Wells Fargo for trespass
(Count I), breach of contract (Count II), negligence (Count
3

At the time Davis filed his amended complaint in the
2012 action, SCRA was codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501, et
seq.
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IV), fraud (Count VI), breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing (Count X), and violation of the antitying provision of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1972, et seq. (Count XI). The amended complaint also
asserts claims against Assurant for breach of contract (Count
III), negligence (Count V), fraud (Count VI), and bad faith
(Count VII). Finally, the amended complaint requests that the
mortgage assignments to Wells Fargo be set aside as
fraudulent (Count IX).4
Wells Fargo moved to dismiss the claims asserted
against it pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and Assurant moved to
dismiss the claims asserted against it pursuant to Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). With its motion, Assurant filed a
signed declaration from one of its corporate officers
distinguishing Assurant from ASIC as separate corporate
entities. The District Court granted both motions in an
opinion and order dated June 8, 2015. Davis v. Wells Fargo
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 14-07014, 2015 WL 3555301
(E.D. Pa. June 8, 2015). The Court dismissed all of Davis’s
4

The amended complaint also included a claim against
both Wells Fargo and Assurant for “loss of rental income”
(Count VIII). (S27.) The District Court dismissed that count
because it concluded the loss of rental income “claim” was an
element of damages rather than a distinct cause of action.
Davis v. Wells Fargo U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 14-07014,
2015 WL 3555301, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 2015). Davis does
not dispute that conclusion on appeal, so we regard any
argument as to that count to be waived and will affirm the
dismissal of that count. See Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103,
113 n.3 (3d Cir. 2007) (“An issue that is not discussed in the
briefs is waived.”).
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claims against Wells Fargo, with the exception of his trespass
claim, on the basis of claim preclusion, because it determined
that Davis could have brought those claims in his 2012 action.
It dismissed the trespass claim as time-barred under
Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations. The Court
also dismissed all of Davis’s claims against Assurant under
Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
concluding that Davis had no Article III standing to assert
them because he should have filed suit against ASIC instead
of Assurant.
Davis filed a timely notice of appeal.
II.

DISCUSSION5

Because this case involves the grant of two separate
motions to dismiss, we consider each in turn. We start our
review with Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and then turn to Assurant’s
motion under Rule (12)(b)(1). Because we conclude that the
District Court’s grant of Assurant’s motion under Rule
12(b)(1) was error, we will also consider Assurant’s
alternative argument that the District Court’s order should be
affirmed on the basis of Rule 12(b)(6) because Davis failed to
state a claim.

5

Wells Fargo rightly concedes that, under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1332, and 1367, the District Court had jurisdiction
over the claims against it. The District Court’s jurisdiction
over Assurant is squarely at issue in this case, and we address
it herein. We have appellate jurisdiction to review a final
decision of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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A.

Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss Under Rule
12(b)(6)

For purposes of reviewing a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6), we are “required to accept as true all
allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that
can be drawn from them after construing them in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant.” Foglia v. Renal Ventures
Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 154 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). However, we disregard legal
conclusions and recitals of the elements of a cause of action
supported by mere conclusory statements. Santiago v.
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation
omitted). “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must
consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the
complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly
authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based
upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223,
230 (3d Cir. 2010).
(1)

Claim Preclusion

Davis first argues that the District Court erred in
holding that many of his claims against Wells Fargo were
barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion, also referred to as
res judicata. The Court concluded that claim preclusion
required dismissal of those claims – though not his claim of
trespass – because they could have been brought at the time
of his 2012 action. It reasoned that Davis was aware of all of
the facts necessary to assert his “new” claims prior to the
filing of his amended complaint in the 2012 action. We
agree.
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Claim preclusion bars suit when three elements are
present: “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit
involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a
subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.” Lubrizol
Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 963 (3d Cir. 1991). In
evaluating whether those elements exist, we do not proceed
mechanically, “but focus on the central purpose of the
doctrine, to require a plaintiff to present all claims arising out
of the same occurrence in a single suit. In so doing, we avoid
piecemeal litigation and conserve judicial resources.” Blunt
v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 277 (3d Cir. 2014)
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 1738 (2015). “The purpose of res judicata is to
‘relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits,
conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent
decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.’” Marmon
Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 726
F.3d 387, 394 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449
U.S. 90, 94 (1980)). To those ends, “[t]he doctrine of res
judicata bars not only claims that were brought in a previous
action, but also claims that could have been brought.” In re
Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008).
Davis does not contest that the District Court’s
dismissal of his claims in the 2012 action was a final
judgment on the merits, nor does he dispute that the 2012
action involved a claim against the same party, Wells Fargo.
He contends instead that his prior suit “was not based on the
same cause of action as the instant case” because he advanced
a different legal theory in that lawsuit than he does now.
(Opening Br. at 14.)
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Under our precedent, there is no single definition of
“cause of action” for purposes of claim preclusion. Rather,
“[w]e … have explained that we take a broad view of what
constitutes the same cause of action and that res judicata
generally is thought to turn on the essential similarity of the
underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims.”
Blunt, 767 F.3d at 277 (internal quotation and editorial marks
omitted). In short, the focus is on facts rather than legal
theories. See Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., 584 F.3d 169,
173 (3d Cir. 2009) (The “analysis does not depend on the
specific legal theory invoked … .”). Res judicata bars a claim
that “arises from the same set of facts as a claim adjudicated
on the merits in the earlier litigation.” Blunt, 767 F.3d at 277.
Davis filed his first federal complaint on October 18,
2012, bringing claims against Wells Fargo for trespass and a
violation of the SCRA. He amended his complaint on
December 7, 2012, including the same causes of action.6
Davis’s current action brings claims against the bank for
trespass, breach of contract, negligence, fraud, breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation
of the anti-tying provision of the Bank Holding Company
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1972. He points to those additional claims
and maintains that they are based on causes of action distinct
from those that he asserted or could have asserted in 2012.
He argues that those claims are necessarily different from his
earlier ones because he was “completely unaware of the fraud
perpetrated by Appellee Wells Fargo, in creating a fictitious
6

The additional factual allegations of the amended
complaint are immaterial here, as they relate only to the
duration of Davis’s military service spent on active duty as
compared to his time as a reservist.
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mortgage assignment” and “was unaware that in fact
Appellee Wells Fargo, had already settled an insurance claim,
financing repairs to the property” when he amended his
complaint in the 2012 action. (Opening Br. at 15.)
But the facts are against him. Although Davis says
that when he filed his amended complaint in 2012, he was
ignorant of what Wells Fargo had done, all of the
documentation on which he relies to assert his mortgage fraud
claims was available to him well before that. The allegations
he made then – unlike the post hoc arguments he makes now
– show that Davis was well aware of all of the operative facts
prior to December 7, 2012, when he filed his amended
complaint.
Most importantly, he has consistently
acknowledged that he learned of the prior insurance claim on
October 28, 2012, when his own separate claim was denied.
Thus, as the District Court noted, “[a]ccording to his own
statements, Davis knew all of the facts necessary to assert the
‘new claims’ against Wells Fargo, at the very latest, over a
month before he filed [his December 7, 2012] amended
complaint.” Davis, 2015 WL 3555301, at *6. None of the
material facts alleged in Davis’s complaint occurred after the
filing of the 2012 action.7 Other than to repeat his conclusory
7

The District Court was careful to note one
“conclusory” allegation pertaining to something that occurred
after Davis filed his amended complaint in the 2012 action
(on December 7, 2012). Davis, 2015 WL 3555301, at *6 n.2.
In paragraph 35 of his amended complaint in the present case,
Davis alleges that “[o]n June 11, 2013, Wells Fargo
negligently replaced the back wall [to the property] … but did
not repair the roof which was the underlying cause of the wall
collapse enabling the roof to continue to leak onto the wall
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statement that he could not have raised his new claims in the
previous action “because [he] had no knowledge of the facts
underlying the new claims” (Opening Br. at 9), Davis offers
nothing to rebut the District Court’s analysis.
Moreover, although Davis contends that he was
“completely unaware” that Wells Fargo was assigned the
mortgage on the Property at the time of the 2012 action, the
allegedly fraudulent assignments upon which his claims rely
were executed more than a year before the filing of his 2012
amended complaint. As he recites in his amended complaint
in this action, those assignments were executed in February
2008 and October 2011, respectively. Surely Davis was
aware or should have been aware of them, because he was
then dealing with Wells Fargo as the purported mortgagee. In
and enable the back wall to continue to deteriorate again.”
(S7 ¶35.) However, the District Court rightly concluded that
Davis’s negligence claim was still barred by res judicata
because “the factual allegations in the amended complaint
make clear that Davis’[s] negligence claim is based on Wells
Fargo’s failure to repair the roof leak in October 2011.”
Davis, 2015 WL 3555301, at *6 n.2. Davis’s negligence
claim alleged that “Wells Fargo did not act reasonably when
it took Plaintiff’s property before it had the legal right to do
so, discovered a small roof leak while in possession of the
property, filed an insurance claim for the leak, received
settlement for the claim, fail[ed] to repair the roof leak with
the money permitting the back wall to collapse and then
return[ed] the property to Plaintiff in a dilapidated condition.”
(S20 ¶117.) Those allegations thus clearly relate to the failure
to repair Davis’s property in late 2011, upon the initial
discovery of the leak.
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addition, as Davis alleges, “[t]he February 8, 2008 fraudulent
assignment was recorded in Philadelphia County records on
February 20, 2008.” (S4.) He identifies no impediment that
would have prevented him from discovering the fraud
purportedly evident in the plain language of those recorded
assignments. Thus, if Davis truly had been unaware of those
assignments, his naiveté is not attributable to anyone but
himself, and his opportunity to bring claims based on them
closed when he failed to assert any such claim in his 2012
action.8
In sum, Davis could have asserted his claims against
Wells Fargo for breach of contract, negligence, fraud, breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
violation of the anti-tying provision of the Bank Holding

8

We hasten to add that we are not suggesting that the
constructive notice afforded to the world by the recording of a
document in accordance with applicable law gives actual
knowledge of specific title transactions to an individual who
is a stranger to the document recorded. But here we are
dealing with a situation in which the identity of the party
claiming to be the mortgagee, Wells Fargo, was well known
to Davis when he commenced the 2012 action. Surely Davis
had a motive to examine public records to see how Wells
Fargo had become the mortgagee inasmuch as Davis executed
the mortgage in favor of a different party, BNC. In other
words, events of which Davis was unquestionably aware
should have signaled him to investigate how Wells Fargo
could have claimed to be the mortgagee more than one year
before he filed his 2012 action.
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Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1972,9 in his 2012 action.
Because he failed to do so, claim preclusion bars him from
asserting them here. Accordingly, we will affirm the District
Court’s dismissal of those claims. As far as Wells Fargo is
concerned, that leaves only the trespass claim for us to
address.10
(2)

Statute of Limitations

Though claim preclusion does not bar Davis’s trespass
claim,
Pennsylvania’s applicable two-year statute of
limitations does. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(4).12 The
11

Davis’s anti-tying claim related to the force-placed
insurance that was obtained in 2009, so that claim also could
have been brought in the 2012 action.
9

10

Davis devotes a section of his brief to arguments
against the application of collateral estoppel, or issue
preclusion. Claim preclusion and issue preclusion are distinct
doctrines, and the District Court relied only on the former to
dismiss certain of Davis’s claims. Consequently, we have no
occasion to address his arguments against the application of
issue preclusion.
11

The trespass claim is not barred by res judicata
because Davis did assert it in the prior action and it was not
dismissed on the merits. Instead, when dismissing the SCRA
claim, the District Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over
the trespass claim.
12
The parties do not dispute that Pennsylvania law
applies.

16

District Court held that, because Davis alleged he was locked
out of his property “from January 2008 through September
2011,” his trespass claim was barred “at the very latest, as of
September 2013.” Davis, 2015 WL 3555301, at *6. The
amended complaint, however, makes clear that Davis did not
receive access to the property until September 2012, one year
later than the District Court said. Nevertheless, even
measured from that later date, the two-year limitations period
still would have expired by the time Davis initiated the
present suit in December 2014.13
13

And perhaps the measuring point should be earlier,
because the limitations period generally begins to run “as
soon as the injury is sustained,” Mest v. Cabot Corp., 449
F.3d 502, 510 (3d Cir. 2006) – in this case, when Davis was
first locked out of the property in January 2008. In general,
“lack of knowledge, mistake or misunderstanding do not toll
the running of the statute of limitations.” Pocono Int’l
Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 468 A.2d 468, 471
(Pa. 1983). As an exception to that principle, Pennsylvania
adheres to the “discovery rule,” which can, in limited
circumstances, afford plaintiffs additional time for the filing
of their claims. But that rule only applies when the plaintiff is
unable, “despite the exercise of diligence, to determine the
injury or its cause … .” Id. The amended complaint gives no
indication that Davis, through the exercise of reasonable
diligence, could not have timely discovered either his
expulsion from the property or the purported invalidity of
Wells Fargo’s transactional documents.
Therefore, the
discovery rule does not save Davis’s trespass claim.
But again, even under the most charitable reading of
his amended complaint, the limitations period ended, at the
very latest, in September 2014. Either way, the statute of
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In apparent recognition that the statute of limitations
had already run when he filed this action, Davis now contends
that the limitations period should be equitably tolled because
Wells Fargo “actively misled” him into believing that it was
the mortgagee, though it “did not … have the note or a valid
mortgage assignment for the property.” (Opening Br. at 1819.) Assuming that were true – as we must – we still can
discern no reason why the invalidity of the assignment
prevented Davis from filing his trespass claim.
We have held that equitable tolling may be appropriate
under three primary, though not exclusive, circumstances:
“(1) where the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff
respecting the plaintiff’s cause of action; (2) where the
plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been prevented from
asserting his or her rights; or (3) where the plaintiff has timely
asserted his or her rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.”
Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380,
1387 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Davis relies on the
first of those factors, but no matter what Wells Fargo told
Davis about its status with regard to the Property, that should
not have left him unable to assert his trespass claim. Even if
he believed until late in 2014 that Wells Fargo held the
mortgage on the Property, it does not follow that the bank had
the right to enter and lock him out before initiating
foreclosure proceedings. If he was misled at all, it was about
a fact of marginal relevance to the trespass.
The 2012 action itself makes the point plainly. Davis
said in his amended complaint in that suit that Wells Fargo
limitations had lapsed by the time Davis filed his complaint in
December 2014.
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was a trespasser because it “did not hold a possessory right to
the property, it only held a mortgage lien.” (S158.) He
obviously did not then think the validity of the mortgage
assignment affected his possessory interest in the Property,
and he was right. We thus cannot hold that Davis was unable
to know the basis for his trespass claim during the limitations
period when he, in fact, made the trespass claim in his prior,
timely-filed suit.14
Accordingly, Davis’s trespass claim is time-barred,
and we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the claim
on that basis.15
14

In dismissing the 2012 action, the District Court also
explained that Davis would not be barred from reasserting his
trespass claim in state court by the statute of limitations if he
were to “promptly file[] a certified transcript of the judgment
and pleadings filed in this action.” (S 279 n.1.) See 42 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 5103(b). But Davis did not refile his trespass
claim in state court, and the District Court in the current
action determined that, in light of Davis’s two-year delay in
refiling the claim in the District Court, it was time-barred by
the two-year limitation period in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(4).
Davis, 2015 WL 3555301, at *6. There is nothing erroneous
in that conclusion.
Although we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of
Davis’s claims against Wells Fargo, we would be remiss if we
did not add a note about the disturbing allegations he has
made. If they are true, the bank locked Davis out of his home
before starting foreclosure proceedings, initiated a series of
fraudulent assignments of the mortgage, and obtained
insurance on the Property as part of a kickback scheme with
15
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B.

Assurant’s Motion to Dismiss Under Rule
12(b)(1)

Assurant moved to dismiss Davis’s complaint on the
basis that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
It argued that Davis lacked standing because he had
the insurer while Davis paid excessive premiums. Although
the insurance should have covered the leak and damage to the
wall, Wells Fargo allegedly settled the damage claim for a
payment of $317 – for roof repairs – but then took no action
to actually repair the roof. And all of this took place during
and around the time that Davis was serving three years of
active duty in the United States Army in a time of war.
When asked about those facts during oral argument,
Wells Fargo did not dispute their veracity, nor did its counsel
seem particularly concerned about the brazenly exploitative
character of the alleged actions of the bank. In one telling
portion of the argument, when asked whether the bank had
the right to make an insurance claim, take money for a roof
repair, and then pocket that money and not make the repair,
all while knowing the result could be further deterioration and
structural damage to the Property, counsel said simply, “that
is what the mortgage gives them the right to do.” See Oral
Argument,
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/152658Davisv.WellsFargo.mp3, at 19:13-19:38 (argued
March 2, 2016). If the allegations are true, they raise serious
questions about bad faith that we are not now in a position to
address. Suffice it to say, however, that although we affirm
the dismissal of Davis’s claims, we hope the allegations of the
amended complaint do not reflect Wells Fargo’s actual
business practices.
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improperly sued Assurant rather than ASIC, its wholly-owned
subsidiary. We exercise plenary review over the District
Court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In re
Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class
Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012).
A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(1) may be either a facial or a factual attack. The former
challenges subject matter jurisdiction without disputing the
facts alleged in the complaint, and it requires the court to
“consider the allegations of the complaint as true.” Petruska
v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006)
(quoting Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d
884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)). The latter, a factual challenge,
attacks the factual allegations underlying the complaint’s
assertion of jurisdiction, either through the filing of an answer
or “otherwise present[ing] competing facts.” Constitution
Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014). In
contrast to a facial challenge, a factual challenge allows “a
court [to] weigh and consider evidence outside the
pleadings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When a
factual challenge is made, “the plaintiff will have the burden
of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist,” and the court “is
free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence
of its power to hear the case.” Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891.
“[N]o presumptive truthfulness attaches to [the] plaintiff’s
allegations … .” Id. Although we exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s legal conclusions, we review the
Court’s findings of fact, including findings related to
jurisdiction, only for clear error. CNA v. United States, 535
F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2008).
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Here, because it submitted a signed declaration
disputing Davis’s factual allegations, Assurant has mounted a
factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. See Int’l
Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Nw. Airlines,
Inc., 673 F.2d 700, 711 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[Defendant’s]
motion was supported by a sworn statement of facts. It
therefore must be construed as a factual, rather than a facial
attack … .”). Assurant had one of its corporate officers
declare that ASIC has a separate corporate existence from its
parent, that Assurant is not involved in ASIC’s daily business
operations, and that Assurant itself has never contracted or
done business with Davis. Given the claimed distinction
between Assurant and ASIC, Assurant argued – and the
District Court agreed – that Davis lacked standing to claim
that Assurant was liable for breach of contract, negligence,
fraud, and bad faith dealing.
Standing is a jurisdictional matter. “Absent Article III
standing, a federal court does not have subject matter
jurisdiction to address a plaintiff’s claims, and they must be
dismissed.” Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d
181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court has recognized
that “the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing
contains three elements,” which the party invoking federal
jurisdiction must establish. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). First, the plaintiff must show that
he suffered an “injury in fact,” meaning a concrete and
particularized invasion of a legally protected interest. Id.
Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate a “causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of – the injury
has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not the result of the independent action of
some third party not before the court.” Id. (internal quotation
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and editorial marks omitted). “Third, it must be likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 561 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Assurant’s standing argument focuses on the latter two
elements of the standing analysis, traceability and
redressability. Assurant contends that its subsidiary, ASIC, is
the actual carrier of the insurance and that, given the
distinction between Assurant and ASIC, Davis’s alleged
injury is not fairly traceable to Assurant’s conduct. Thus,
says Assurant, a judgment against it would do nothing to
redress the harm that Davis supposedly suffered at the hands
of ASIC. While that argument has some superficial appeal, it
is wrong. Assurant’s argument is better understood as a welldisguised challenge to the legal merits of Davis’s case, not as
a challenge to his standing to pursue it.
Taking the argument from its start, Assurant says that
ASIC, its wholly-owned subsidiary, should have been the
named defendant in Davis’s complaint. But that is a matter
open to reasonable dispute. Assurant and ASIC are related
entities and the extent of their intertwined operations is a
matter that has not yet been tested by the adversary process.
Even if Assurant were to assert that it had absolutely no
relationship with ASIC, however, its argument ought still to
be treated as going to the merits of the case. Like all merits
arguments, the question of whether a plaintiff has sued the
correct defendant should ordinarily be addressed at the
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pleading stage by affording the plaintiff the protections
provided by Rule 12(b)(6).16
Assurant acknowledges that parent corporations may
be held liable for the actions of their subsidiaries under
certain conditions, but it argues that Davis’s complaint “does
not make a single factual averment that would support a claim
for piercing the corporate veil.” (Assurant Br. at 15.) It thus
uses its declaration to establish a factual predicate (i.e., the
distinction between ASIC and Assurant) for a legal argument
addressed squarely to the merits of Davis’s complaint (i.e.,
the inability to pierce the corporate veil to hold Assurant
liable for ASIC’s actions). But, if we accept the factual
allegations of the complaint, as we would under Rule
12(b)(6), the distinction between ASIC and Assurant is not
established and, in fact, is irrelevant. There is no veil to
pierce because Davis says Assurant is the insurance carrier on
16

We do not believe that the phrasing chosen by the
Supreme Court in setting out the second Lujan factor – that
“the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action
of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action
of some third party not before the court,” 504 U.S. at 560
(internal quotation and editorial marks omitted) – was meant
to transform ordinary merits arguments about who is legally
responsible for an injury into questions of jurisdiction. Our
cases have instead treated traceability as a question of
causation, asking whether a plaintiff has “allege[d] facts that
plausibly support a causal connection between [the plaintiff]’s
injury-in-fact and [the defendant’s conduct].” In re Schering
Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678
F.3d 235, 247 (3d Cir. 2012). See infra note 19 and
accompanying text.
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the policy in question. With the factual foundation for its
argument removed, Assurant’s position has little persuasive
force. Its contention that ASIC is the proper defendant may,
in the end, be a strong merits defense against Davis’s claims,
but it does not mean that Davis does not have standing to
bring his claims, and to bring them against Assurant. Cf.
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty &
Co., 267 F.3d 340, 346 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Whether a party has
standing to bring claims and whether a party’s claims are
barred by an equitable defense are two separate questions, to
be addressed on their own terms.”).
The standing requirement is analytically distinct from
the merits of the underlying dispute. Standing is meant to
serve as “an essential and unchanging part of the case-orcontroversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at
560. Here, Davis has alleged that Assurant breached a
contract and committed various state-law torts. If for no other
reason, a case or controversy exists to determine whether
Davis is suing the right insurance company and, even if he
should have sued ASIC, whether he may pierce the corporate
veil and hold Assurant accountable for the alleged
misconduct of ASIC. Davis argues that Assurant may be held
responsible; Assurant argues that it may not. That is a merits
question.
Assurant’s assertions to the contrary prove too much.
If accepted, they would allow any litigant whose defense is
“you’ve got the wrong party” to frame that lack-ofresponsibility defense not as a merits challenge to be tried or
to be considered under Rule 12(b)(6) or the summary
judgment provisions of Rule 56 but as a Rule 12(b)(1)
standing challenge, thereby empowering the defendant to
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buttress its legal arguments with factual assertions that
contradict those in the complaint. Although standing and
merits questions may involve overlapping facts, standing is
generally an inquiry about the plaintiff: is this the right person
to bring this claim. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818
(1997) (“The standing inquiry focuses on whether the
plaintiff is the proper party to bring this suit … .”); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (“The fundamental aspect of
standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his
complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he
wishes to have adjudicated.”). It is generally not an inquiry
into whether the plaintiff has got the right defendant.
The confusion generated by Assurant is a new iteration
of an old problem. We have already held that “a district court
must take care not to reach the merits of a case when deciding
a Rule 12(b)(1) motion.”
CNA, 535 F.3d at 144.
“Jurisdictional finding of genuinely disputed facts is
inappropriate when the jurisdictional issue and substantive
issues are so intertwined that the question of jurisdiction is
dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the
merits of an action.” Sun Valley Gasoline, Inc. v. Ernst
Enters, Inc., 711 F.2d 138, 139 (9th Cir. 1983) (internal
quotation marks omitted). As we stated in Kulick v. Pocono
Downs Racing Association, when a factual challenge to
jurisdiction attacks facts at the core of the merits of the
underlying cause of action, “the proper procedure for the
district court is to find that jurisdiction exists and to deal with
the objection as a direct attack on the merits of the plaintiff’s
case.” 816 F.2d 895, 898 n.5 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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We have repeatedly cautioned against allowing a Rule
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction to be turned into an attack on the merits. E.g.,
Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir.
2000); Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware Cty., Pa., 983 F.2d
1277, 1280-81 (3d Cir. 1993); Kehr Packages, Inc. v.
Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1408-09 (3d Cir. 1991);
Kulick, 816 F.2d at 897; Johnsrud v. Carter, 620 F.2d 29, 3233 (3d Cir. 1980); Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. Caution is
necessary because the standards governing the two rules
differ markedly, as Rule 12(b)(6) provides greater procedural
safeguards for plaintiffs than does Rule 12(b)(1). First,
proceeding under Rule 12(b)(1) inverts the burden of
persuasion. When presenting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the
defendant bears the burden to show that the plaintiff has not
stated a claim. Kehr Packages, 926 F.2d at 1409. But under
Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff must prove the court has subject
matter jurisdiction. Id. The two rules also treat the
complaint’s factual allegations very differently. Unlike Rule
12(b)(6), under which a defendant cannot contest the
plaintiff’s factual allegations, Rule 12(b)(1) allows a
defendant to attack the allegations in the complaint and
submit contrary evidence in its effort to show that the court
lacks jurisdiction. Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891. Thus,
improper consideration of a merits question under Rule
12(b)(1) significantly raises both the factual and legal burden
on the plaintiff. Given the differences between the two rules,
“[a] plaintiff may be prejudiced if what is, in essence, a Rule
12(b)(6) challenge to the complaint is treated as a Rule
12(b)(1) motion.” Kehr Packages, 926 F.2d at 1409.17
17

We addressed that prejudice clearly in Kulick. 816
F.2d at 897. There, a horse owner brought a civil rights
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Rule 12(b)(6) – with its attendant procedural and
substantive protections for plaintiffs – is the proper vehicle
for the early testing of a plaintiff’s claims. Assurant does not
contend that Davis is the wrong person to bring his claims.
Rather, it argues that he has filed suit against the wrong party,
that his claims against Assurant are actually without merit
because Assurant has done nothing wrong. That may be true,
and, if so, the ordinary course of litigation will root it out.
But Assurant may not short-circuit the usual process, flip the
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a racing association,
alleging that he had been ejected from a racetrack without due
process. The district court dismissed the case for want of
subject matter jurisdiction, because the plaintiff had failed to
establish that the defendant’s actions were taken under color
of state law, as required under § 1983. We reversed,
recognizing that “a court has jurisdiction over the dispute so
long as the plaintiff alleges that defendant’s actions violate
the requisite federal law … . Once the plaintiff has met this
threshold pleading requirement, however, the truth of the
facts alleged in the complaint is a question on the merits, as is
the legal question whether the facts alleged establish a
violation.” Id. at 897-98. We emphasized that, were it
“[o]therwise, the district court could turn an attack on the
merits, against which the party has the procedural protections
of a full trial including the right to a jury, into an attack on
jurisdiction, which a court may resolve at any time without a
jury pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
and 12(h)(3).” Id. at 898. In reversing, we held that the
district court should not have treated its findings of fact “as
conclusive on the issue of jurisdiction because the presence of
state action was properly a concern not of jurisdiction but of
the merits.” Id. at 896.
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burden of persuasion, and permit itself to submit competing
facts to support its argument.
Jurisdiction … is not defeated as [Assurant]
seem[s] to contend, by the possibility that the
averments might fail to state a cause of action
on which [Davis] could actually recover. For it
is well settled that the failure to state a proper
cause of action calls for a judgment on the
merits and not for a dismissal for want of
jurisdiction.
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946).
In light of its limited protections for plaintiffs, Rule
12(b)(1) must not be expanded beyond its proper purpose.18
The Supreme Court has authorized courts to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction due to merits-related
defects in only narrow categories of cases. “[A] suit may
sometimes be dismissed for want of jurisdiction where the
alleged claim under the Constitution or federal statutes clearly
appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of
obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly
insubstantial and frivolous.” Bell, 327 U.S. at 682-83.
“[D]ismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not appropriate merely
because the legal theory alleged is probably false, but only
because the right claimed is ‘so insubstantial, implausible,
foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise
18

Uniquely, Rule 12(b)(1) allows a district court to
make findings of fact that contradict the allegations in the
complaint, at the very outset of litigation, before any
discovery has taken place.
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completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal
controversy.’” Kulick, 816 F.2d at 899 (quoting Oneida
Indian Nation v. Cty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974)).
In this vein, when a case raises a disputed factual issue that
goes both to the merits and jurisdiction, district courts must
“demand less in the way of jurisdictional proof than would be
appropriate at a trial stage.” Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 892
(holding that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) would be
“unusual” when the facts necessary to succeed on the merits
are at least in part the same as must be alleged or proven to
withstand jurisdictional attacks).
Given the tightly
circumscribed definition of these categories, dismissal via a
Rule 12(b)(1) factual challenge to standing should be granted
sparingly. Here, Davis’s claims against Assurant are not so
insubstantial as to fall within those categories.19
The District Court erroneously accepted Assurant’s
standing argument. In doing so, it shifted to Davis the burden
of persuasion that properly falls on Assurant on a motion to
19

It is possible, of course, to imagine a plaintiff who
sues Corporation X on a claim that it is responsible for a civil
war somewhere on the other side of the planet. To establish
its standing, that plaintiff would have to satisfy the second
Lujan factor and show an injury “fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the
independent action of some third party not before the court.”
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation and editorial marks
omitted). That is, we believe, the kind of implausible
allegation the Supreme Court had in mind when it crafted the
exception permitting dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for
wholly insubstantial claims to jurisdiction.
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dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), and deprived him of the
deference due the factual allegations of his complaint.
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order insofar
as it concluded that it was without subject matter jurisdiction
over Davis’s claims against Assurant. 20
C.

Assurant’s Motion to Dismiss Under Rule
12(b)(6)

Assurant also moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), which the District Court did not address given its
dismissal of the case under Rule 12(b)(1). Since we may
affirm on any basis supported by the record, Guthrie v. Lady
Jane Collieries, Inc., 722 F.2d 1141, 1144-45 (3d Cir. 1983),
we now consider that 12(b)(6) motion.
Reviewing Assurant’s arguments under Rule 12(b)(6)
rather than Rule 12(b)(1) means that Assurant’s declaration
20

In support of its argument, Assurant cites several
cases in which it has persuaded district courts across the
country that its standing argument is meritorious. Montoya v.
PNC Bank, N.A., No. 14-20474-CIV, 2014 WL 4248208, at
*5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2014); Cochran-May v. Wells Fargo
Bank, NA, No. 2:12-cv-240, 2014 WL 361177, at *2 (S.D.
Tex. Feb. 3, 2014); Xi Chen Lauren v. PNC Bank, N.A., No.
2:13-cv-762, 2013 WL 5565511, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 8,
2013); Roberts v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 4:12-cv-200,
2013 WL 1233268, at *7 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2013); Cannon
v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 917 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1032 (N.D.
Cal. 2013). We have considered each of those cases and,
insofar as they accept Assurant’s standing argument under
Rule 12(b)(1), we reject their reasoning.
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distinguishing itself from ASIC cannot factor into our
analysis, and we must accept the well-pleaded facts of the
amended complaint as true. Along with those facts, we may
also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint[,] matters of
public record,” and documents “integral to or explicitly relied
upon in the complaint.” Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249
(3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and emphasis
omitted). Although we are usually confined to the allegations
of the complaint, “the justification for the integral documents
exception is that it is not unfair to hold a plaintiff accountable
for the contents of documents [he] must have used in framing
[his] complaint, nor should a plaintiff be able to evade
accountability for such documents simply by not attaching
them to his complaint.” Id. at 250.
We start with Davis’s breach of contract claim. To
make out that claim, Davis must allege facts giving rise to a
reasonable inference that discovery will reveal evidence that
“there was a contract, [Assurant] breached it, and [he]
suffered damages from the breach.” McShea v. City of
Philadelphia, 995 A.2d 334, 340 (Pa. 2010).21 In his
amended complaint, Davis alleges that he had an insurance
contract with Assurant and that Assurant breached the
contract by failing to “adequately investigate and pay the roof
leak claim … which led to and caused the back wall of
[Davis’s] property to deteriorate and collapse.” (S16.)
Assurant’s response is that, given the distinction between
ASIC and Assurant, it “does not have any contractual
relationship with [Davis].” (Assurant Br. at 23.) But the
21

Again, there is no dispute that Pennsylvania law

applies.
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distinction between ASIC and Assurant is only established by
the very declaration that we must ignore in ruling on
Assurant’s 12(b)(6) motion. Further, there are at least two
integral documents attached as exhibits to the amended
complaint – the letters settling the first insurance claim and
denying Davis’s second claim – indicating that an insurance
contract existed between Davis and an insurer using
letterhead bearing the names of both “American Security
Insurance Company” and “ASSURANT Specialty Property.”
(S92, 105 (original emphasis).)22 Thus, Assurant’s name
appeared, in bolded font, at the top of the letter denying
Davis’s insurance claim.23 Viewing the allegations of the
complaint and integral documents in the light most favorable
to Davis – and ignoring the facts set out in Assurant’s
declaration – we cannot say that those documents fail to
“raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover
proof” that a contract existed between Davis and Assurant,
that Assurant breached the contract, and that it thereby caused
damage to Davis’s Property. Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp.,
These two letters are integral to Davis’s amended
complaint because he clearly “relied upon these documents in
framing the complaint.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec.
Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
22

23

In its brief, Assurant cites those same two
documents, noting that they “are correspondence clearly
returnable and pertaining to [Davis’s] insurance policy with
ASIC, as indicated by the ASIC returnable addresses across
the top of each.” (Assurant Br. at 24.) Assurant neglects to
mention that both documents also bear its own name in bold,
in the largest font on the page, in their upper-left-hand corner.

33

809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016). Accordingly, dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) of Davis’s breach of contract claim
against Assurant is not warranted.
Although Davis’s breach of contract claim survives, he
cannot bring a separate bad faith claim against Assurant.
“[U]nder Pennsylvania law, a ‘claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is subsumed in a
breach of contract claim.’” Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d
417, 432 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting LSI Title Agency, Inc. v.
Evaluation Servs., Inc., 951 A.2d 384, 392 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2008)). In other words, Davis cannot maintain a bad faith
claim “separate and distinct from a breach of contract claim.
Rather, a claim arising from a breach of the covenant of good
faith must be prosecuted as a breach of contract claim, as the
covenant does nothing more than imply certain obligations
into the contract itself.” JHE, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth.,
No. 1790, 2002 WL 1018941, at *5 (Pa. Com. Pl. May 17,
2002). Because Davis cannot maintain an independent cause
of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing under Pennsylvania law, that claim should be
dismissed and his arguments concerning bad faith should be
addressed in connection with his surviving breach of contract
claim.
We also agree with Assurant’s argument that Davis’s
negligence and fraud claims are time barred under
Pennsylvania’s applicable two-year statute of limitations. See
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(7). With respect to the negligence
claim, Davis alleged that Assurant “breached its duty of care
to [him] when it failed to investigate, estimate and pay
[Davis’s] roof leak claim leaving the property unrepaired and
exposed to the elements which caused the back wall to
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deteriorate, collapse and grow toxic black mold that spread
throughout the house.” (S21.) As previously discussed,
Davis knew that Assurant denied his insurance claim
regarding the roof leak by (at the latest) October 28, 2012,
more than two years before he filed suit in December 2014.
The same is true of Davis’s fraud claim, which is premised on
the purported kickback scheme between Wells Fargo and
Assurant and on Assurant’s coverage responses to the
Property’s roof leak. The insurance policy was placed on the
property in April 2009, and Assurant denied Davis’s
insurance claim on October 28, 2012. Thus, by the time
Davis filed his complaint in December 2014, his fraud claim
was also barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
Nothing in the amended complaint or the documents integral
to it suggests that the statute of limitations should be tolled
for any reason, and Davis – by not filing a reply brief
addressed to any of Assurant’s 12(b)(6) arguments – has not
argued for tolling in this regard.24
Accordingly, on remand, Davis’s sole surviving claim
is his breach of contract claim against Assurant.25
Assurant also contends that Davis’s fraud claim
should be dismissed because it fails to meet the heightened
pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b), which requires averments of fraud to be “state[d] with
particularity.” Because we dismiss Davis’s fraud claim by
application of the statute of limitations, we need not address
that argument.
24

Finally, we will also affirm the District Court’s order
insofar as it denied Davis’s motion to amend the (already)
amended complaint. Davis has not addressed the denial of
25
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III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District
Court’s order in part, vacate it in part, and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

leave to amend anywhere in his brief, and “[w]e have
consistently held that [a]n issue is waived unless a party
raises it in its opening brief.” In re Fosamax (Alendronate
Sodium) Products Liab. Litig. (No. II), 751 F.3d 150, 157 (3d
Cir. 2014) (second alteration in original) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
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